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More and more listed companies are trying equity incentive in China, but there has not yet formed a unified understanding of the impact of equity incentive on investment efficiency. Based on the theory of management power, using the investment model of Richardson and choosing Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies which has implemented with equity incentive from 2006 to 2015 as research sample, we verify the impact of equity incentive on investment efficiency. It is proved that the management equity incentive has a significant negative impact on the investment efficiency of the enterprise through comparing the relationship between equity incentive and investment efficiency of the two types of listed companies, overinvestment and underinvestment. The effect of the relationship between the equity incentive and the investment efficiency is different according to different properties of actual controller. Compared with state holding companies, it is weak that the negative relationship between equity incentive and the investment efficiency in non-state holding companies. The size of listed companies will also influence the relationship. The final results show that the implementation of equity incentives does no help to curb overinvestment or ease the underinvestment. Keywords—Managerial Equity Incentive; Investment Efficiency; Management authority theory

Empirical Study on Management Equity Incentive and Investment Efficiency Based on Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies