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As an effective tool to solve the principal-agent problem, equity incentive is a long-term incentive way to stabilize the leadership team and key technical staffs. However, compared with the western countries, Chinese listed companies have different market conditions and institutional background for equity incentive. Thus there are still disputes in industry about option’s effectiveness in public companies of China. And given the special background in China, it is significant to dialectically analyze the implementation of stock option incentive. This paper starts with the basic theory of equity incentive, analyzes the existing problems of equity incentive in China, and gives the corresponding solutions. Finally, by means of literature review and field research, this paper finds that listed companies in China are faced by the following problems: hitchhiking, fewer objects of equity incentive and incomplete assessment system. Then the paper offers the following solutions: optimize equity incentive design, define the scope of equity incentive objects, improve capital markets and strictly control the selection of company management. Keywords—Equity incentive; Corporate governance; Problem; Methods

Study on Equity Incentive of Listed Companies in China