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This paper analyzes the ongoing game scenario of local governments’ efforts in developing new energy industries under a tournament-type performance appraisal system and draws two conclusions on the basis of chicken game and firstprice sealed auction. The two conclusions are: (1) local governments’ competition efforts present a likelihood of excess capacity in the new energy sector instead of the intended overall promotion of the industries, thus reducing the local profits and harming the long-term sector-wide benefits; (2) the competing game between new-energy investors and local governments assumes a high degree of possibility of landing local governments in a prisoners’ dilemma, thus alluring local governments to adopt any preferential policy options in fear of losing the game. Keywords-local governments; new energy industries; performance assessment mechanism; game theory; chicken game

A Game Theory Analysis on Local Governments Competition for New Energy Industries