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The constant evolution of access control requirements and the dynamic environment in which they evolve require nowadays quick and instant decision-making related to risk of illegitimate access in Information Systems. Various contributions defined in the literature aim to overcome or to mitigate related risks and paradoxically adopted the hypothesis of reliability and validity of access control policies. However, the corruption of these policies is a security aspect of great importance and should be handled actively because (i) an access control policy is also exposed to the same threats as the managed data is and (ii) properties and parameters of the concrete policy at a given stage may differ, in a critical manner, from a reference stage. We define a reliable and complete solution for risk management in the context of Database Servers. We intend to define a rigorous risk management approach that mainly verifies recommendations of the standard ISO 31000:2009. Our approach takes into consideration all identified threats on a Database Server and provides an environment for the analysis of the correlation between the threats detected in particular by different security devices. To ensure a high level of surety, we opt for defining a formal framework that allows to efficiently address this problematic and to formally represent and verify our risk management processes.

Towards a Reliable Formal Framework for Enhancing Risk Assessment in Access Control Systems