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O presente artigo e uma critica a interpretacao rortyana de Dewey. Nosso proposito e argumentar que as hipoteses de Rorty sobre o pragmatismo deweyano nao podem ser confirmadas. Existem diferencas significativas entre a filosofia de Dewey e o neopragmatismo de Rorty. Nesse sentido, faremos objecoes a alguns conceitos que aparecem na apropriacao rortyana da filosofia de Dewey, a saber, a ideia do fim da filosofia, o relativismo expresso em sua critica a ciencia e a teoria conversacionalista como substituta da epistemologia. Argumentaremos, especialmente, contra a proposta de Rorty, em que o conceito de linguagem tomaria o lugar do conceito de experiencia na obra de Dewey. Assim, apresentaremos a metafisica empirica de Dewey em toda a sua especificidade, mostrando a inadequacao da interpretacao rortyana, condicao que nos ajudara a confirmar o carater nao-rortyano da filosofia de Dewey. Abstract : This article is a critique of Rorty interpretation of Dewey. Our purpose is to argue that the hipoteses  of Rorty about Dewey's pragmatism can not be confirmed. There are significant differences between the philosophy of Dewey and Rorty's neo-pragmatism. Accordingly, we will object to some concepts that appear in the appropriation of Dewey Rorty's philosophy, namely, the idea of the end of philosophy, relativism expressed in his criticism of the science and theory of epistemology conversacionalista as a substitute. Argue, especially against the proposed Rorty, in which the concept of language would replace the concept of experience in the work of Dewey. Thus, we present empirical metaphysics Dewey in all its specificity, showing the inadequacy of interpretation Rorty, a condition that will help us to confirm a character non-Rorty's philosophy of Dewey. Keywords : Dewey, Rorty, pragmatism, experience, metaphysics

O caráter não-rortyano da filosofia de Dewey/The non-rortyan character of Dewey s Philosophy