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In the recent philosophical literature, a debate has emerged between compatibilists over the nature of moral responsibility. Though they agree that agents need to exercise control over their actions to be morally responsible for them, some compatibilists have argued that history is a necessary component of moral responsibility. That is, historical compatibilists believe that an agent needs to have the right kind of history leading up to an action for that action to authentically belong to an agent. In this thesis, I will address the important arguments for historical compatibilism and argue that the position is incorrect. The position I will defend holds that exercising control over your actions is necessary and sufficient for moral responsibility and that considerations of history are not necessary. The position I defend is referred to as ‘non-historical compatibilism.’

Compatibilist Theories of Moral Responsibility and History: A Defence of Non-historical Compatibilism