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For several decades two different communities have been working on the formal security of cryptographic protocols. Many efforts have been made recently to take benefit of both approaches, in brief: the comprehensiveness of computational models and the automatizability of formal methods. The purpose of this paper is to investigate an original approach to relate the two views, that is: to extend existing Dolev-Yao models to account for random polynomial-time (Las Vegas) computability. This is done first by noticing that Dolev-Yao models can be seen as transition systems, possibly infinite. We then extend these transition systems with computation times and probabilities. The extended models can account for normal Dolev-Yao transitions as well as nonstandard operations such as inverting a one-way function. Our main contribution consists of showing that under sufficient realistic assumptions the extended models are equivalent to standard Dolev-Yao models as far as security is concerned. Thus our work enlarges the scope of existing decision procedures.

Random Polynomial-Time Attacks and Dolev-Yao Models