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We examine lobbying activities of two players theoretically and experimentally by using Tullock contests. Players’ interests can be different. In one extreme, two players’ interests are independent where the winner takes all. In the other extreme, players’ interests are perfectly aligned where the winner and the loser enjoy the prize value equally. Choosing the host cities of the FIFA World Cup and of the Olympic Game are in the former example and two firms in the oil industry engaging in the lobbying activities against the tough environmental regulation are in the latter example. Our model incorporates all the other intermediate cases. Our model is also interpreted as a model of lobbying activities of two firms cross holding each other’s shares. We show theoretically that the equilibrium amounts of investment of players are the same in the simultaneous and in the sequential contests. Based on our theoretical results, we ran experiments to examine whether players’ investment decisions were influenced by how aligned their interests were. Players over-invested and variances were large both in the sequential and in the simultaneous games, but they played the Nash equilibrium 76.49% of the time in the simultaneous game and 75.30% in the sequential game when their interests were perfectly aligned. Furthermore, our experiment observed that investment decisions between the simultaneous and the sequential contests are similar, except the case where two players’ interests were perfectly aligned.

LOBBYING ACTIVITIES OF FIRMS WITH VARIOUS INTERESTS