English (United Kingdom)

https://curated-unify.zendy.io/wp-json/zendy-region/v1/featured_content/oa?rat=en

https://curated-unify.zendy.io/wp-json/zendy-region/v1/highlighted_journal/

Zendy Open

Presents the pdf analysis as premium feature

PDF Analysis

Insights

Presents the summarisation as premium feature

Summarisation

Presents the keyphrase highlighting as premium feature

Keyphrase Highlighting

Presents the zaia usage as premium feature

ZAIA

Zendy Tools

Zendy Plus

Presents the access of premium content as premium feature

Premium Content

By their very nature, loss of control accidents are unanticipated and rare, and their precursors are rare also. Onboard systems to detect and mitigate these precursors must work|and work correctly|when required but must not introduce new malfunctions or unintended functions. How can we provide assurance that software invoked in such rare and unanticipated circumstances is t for certication? We argue that software systems such as these are but an extreme example of general trends that undermine much of the standards-based approach to software assurance used in aircraft certication. These trends include component-based software, complex integration, continuous modication, and load- and run-time adaptation. We propose that safety cases based on explicit goals, evidence, and argument provide a rmer foundation for assurance, and a framework within which it is possible to address the rare and the unexpected. Specically, we propose that just as methods to prevent loss of control move certain software adaptation processes to runtime, so should some of the assurance and verication processes move to runtime also. The paper outlines a technical approach to such \just-in-time certication."

How Do we Certify for the Unexpected?