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For many epistemologies, theory and practice remain bifurcated concepts that facilitate the application of theoretical, epistemic structures upon groups of people and their practices without consideration for the actuality of these people and practices. In contrast, an appropriate epistemology should recognize existing practices that produce what we take to be knowledge, and develop theories of knowledge and rationality based upon them, not in spite of them. In short, an appropriate epistemology should be a "practicist" epistemology. Endorsing an epistemology that gives fundamental attention to the structure and purpose of our actual practices is not new, but oftentimes, convincing arguments for a practicist epistemology are not forthright. In this paper, I argue that when we consider the nature of epistemological theorizing, and the nature of theories themselves, whether they are meant to organize or fit reality and our experiences, we are unable to separate out the role and importance of practices. Therefore, we should likewise give due respect to the primacy of epistemic practices which comprise the impetus for our epistemological theorizing. he rift between theory and practice persists in areas of epistemology where abstract preoccupations relegate concrete human practices and their consequences to the fringes of concern. It is commonplace to measure the fruitfulness of epistemologies based on how well they reconcile dilemmas such as global skepticism, the lottery paradox, and Gettier's instances of justified true belief that do not warrant the designation of 'knowledge'. Other means of evaluation include how well epistemologies sustain their theories of justification and avoid the regress problem, as is frequently done with foundationalist, coherentist, and contextualist programs. But while many of these theoretical concerns are appropriate at times - I do not discount them - they cannot be esteemed at the expense of not taking seriously our existing epistemic practices. It is not enough to

The Inescapability of Theorizing Practices within Epistemology