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The following a rule's discussion raises central questions about the nature of our concepts. In this essay, we place and discuss a thesis of Crispin Wright's approach, namely following a rule always involves an epistemic commitment. According to our view, the following of rules for cases that Wright called "basic cases" (cases that cannot be reduced to a modus ponens structure of reasoning) carries no epistemic commitment. Such cases are basic linguistic commitments that without being true or false allow the rest of our conceptual building to be judged as true or false. So, we agreed with Wright on grasping any rule is a case that requires rational competence but we discuss his criterion to point out the rationality of rule

Seguir una regla: ¿Se trata siempre de un caso de conocimiento?