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Recently, Gunn, Allison and Abbott (GAA)[http://arxiv.org/pdf/1402.2709v2.pdf] proposed a new scheme to utilizeelectromagnetic waves for eavesdropping on the Kirchhoff-law-Johnson-noise(KLJN) secure key distribution. We proved in a former paper [Fluct. Noise Lett.13 (2014) 1450016] that GAA's mathematical model is unphysical. Here we analyzeGAA's cracking scheme and show that, in the case of a loss-free cable, itprovides less eavesdropping information than in the earlier(Bergou)-Scheuer-Yariv mean-square-based attack [Kish LB, Scheuer J, Phys.Lett. A 374 (2010) 2140-2142], while it offers no information in the case of alossy cable. We also investigate GAA's claim to be experimentally capable ofdistinguishing - using statistics over a few correlation times only - thedistributions of two Gaussian noises with a relative variance difference ofless than 10^-8. Normally such distinctions would require hundreds of millionsof correlations times to be observable. We identify several potentialexperimental artifacts as results of poor KLJN design, which can lead to GAA'sassertions: deterministic currents due to spurious harmonic components causedby ground loops, DC offset, aliasing, non-Gaussian features includingnon-linearities and other non-idealities in generators, and the time-derivativenature of GAA's scheme which tends to enhance all of these artifacts.

On the "cracking" scheme in the paper "A directional coupler attack against the Kish key distribution system" by Gunn, Allison and Abbott