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During September-November 1968 there was a crisis situation in the Romanian-Soviet relations, generated by the criticism that the Romanian government formulated for the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia on August 23, 1968. This crisis came to the attention of decision-makers in the United Kingdom and Allied bodies within NATO. Both the British Cabinet and the representatives of the North Atlantic Alliance member countries held several meetings in which the issue of Romania and Yugoslavia was discussed in the context of Soviet threats. The Secretary of State of the Foreign Office visited Romania and discussed with Nicolae Ceauşescu, Ion Gheorghe Maurer and Corneliu Mănescu. This article aims to present debates within the NATO and the UK bodies on the political crisis in the Romanian-Soviet relations from the autumn of 1968 and the position adopted by them against a possible Soviet invasion in Romania and Yugoslavia.

The Position of NATO and Great Britain on the Crisis in Soviet-Romanian Relations During the Autumn 1968 As Reflected in British Documents