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There are two diverging views on singular thoughts: a ‘latitudinarian’ or ‘liberal’ one (Sosa 1970, Hawthorne & Manley 2012) appealing to Fregeans, on which thinking a de dicto proposition that predicates some property f with respect to some individuating concept a of x suffices for having a singular thought about x; and a narrower one attractive to Millians, on which it requires acquaintance — some special relation binding the thinker with the object of reference, a causal psychological relation like perception or memory. In Mental Files, Francois Recanati advances a liberalization of the acquaintance view which, even if I do not find it fully convincing, I will not question here; I will assume that it deals well with Millian concerns from a perspective hospitable to the Fregean.1 Now, in the 1960s and 1970s Castaneda, Perry and Lewis argued that thoughts about oneself ‘as oneself’ — de se thoughts — raise special issues. In the first section I briefly survey the data, and Perry’s and Lewis’s contrasting proposals: while Lewis aims to account for de se thoughts by taking the subject away from such contents, which are thus properties instead of complete traditional proposi-

The Self File and Immunity to Error Through Misidentification