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Last lecture I sketched constitutive conditions on having representational mind, specifically on having perceptual states. I also outlined what is known about the evolutionary origins of perception. Those origins lie in simple animals – bees, spiders, locusts. In this lecture, I discuss constitutive and empirical conditions on having propositional attitudes. I argued that all perceptual representational content contains both context-bound singular (or plural) referential elements and general attributive elements that accompany and are applied by the singular elements, and function to be accurate of perceived particulars. We allude to such general elements when we count an individual as perceiving a particular as such and such. The key difference between perceptual representational content and propositional representational content is that all propositional content contains a main predicate, an attributive that functions predicatively without being applied to make an attribution by a singular or plural, demonstrative-governed, referential application. Main predicates do not function in referring, and are not applied attributively by a referential element. This functional independence of singular or plural reference is most saliently marked by the main predicate’s having widest scope – outside the scope of any identifica-

Steps Toward Origins of Propositional Thought