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La persona, siguiendo en esto a Boecio y Tomas de Aquino, es sustancia individual de naturaleza racional, es decir, un supuesto que, en cuanto que tal, es algo completo, un todo unitario cuyos aspectos fundamentales son la individualidad y la subsistencia. Con esto, lo definitorio del supuesto personal, lo que diferencia esencialmente a las personas de los individuos inanimados, los animales y las plantas, es la mente. Pero su constitutivo formal es el esse, el acto de ser personal. Desde el ser la subsistencia de la persona se nos revela como autoposesion y la individualidad, como total incomunicabilidad, ambas de un ser pleno. Por lo demas, en cuanto parte de la especie, en cuanto sustancia incompleta, el alma separada no es hipostasis, pero el ser con el que funda la persona le pertenece en propiedad y, en este sentido, conserva la indole personal, y ello explica su tendencia natural a la reunion con el cuerpo.The person, according to Boecio and Thomas Aquinas, is an individual substance of rational nature, that is to say, a suppositum and, as such, it is something complete, an unitary whole whose fundamental aspects are individuality and subsistence. Accordingly, the mind is what defines suppositum as a person, and it is also what essentially differentiates it from inanimate individuals, animals and plants. However, his formal constituent is the esse, the act of being a person. From esse, the subsistence of the person is revealed as self-possession and individuality as total incommunicability, both of them belonging to a full being. In addition, the separated soul is not hypostasis in the sense that it is part of a species as incomplete substance, but its esse that becomes the person and belongs to it. In this sense, it retains its personal nature, and it explains its natural tend to reunite with the body

metafísica y persona

Sustancia individual de naturaleza racional: el principio personificador y la índole del alma separada. Individual Substance of Rational Nature: The Personification Principle and the Nature of the Separated Soul