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subjectivity, in building objectivity into itself [and] making subjectivity objective.30 although hermans points to the need we have to think a “well-developed regulatory system...for flexible movement between positions and for innovation of the self”31, what appears to be missing in the dialogic account, and what I see hegel as being able to provide, is the language of that ‘emptying’ as the ‘I’ or self comes in contact with the actualanother voiceand the ethical challenge inherent in the structure of its response. Considering the mediation of the transition between consciousness and self-consciousness, and how it makes possible or arises out of the negotiation of these possible ‘I’ positions, hegel states that “the soul, when it feels limitation of its power, reflects itself into itself and expels the corporeity from itself as something extraneous to it.”32 We can perhaps offer a dialogical interpretation of this limitation as that encounter which takes the form of an address both from and to an other in which the soul (a condition for the limitation to be experienced as such) becomes aware of itself as an ‘I’, “for the ‘I’ is the lightning which pierces through the natural soul and consumes its natural being.”33 hermans offers an analogous interpretation in historical terms: “The notion of mediated dialogue enriches dialogical self theory because it poses an important question: to whom is the speaking person speaking?”34 Given that the other is the limit case of the subject, I am asking whether the present historical construction of the dialogical idea of self is itself a limit case: a generative description which even as it makes explicit the voices and positions in our historical present, throws us back onto the question of why certain voices and not others are heard. If the dialogical self is the historically immediate shape of the self, can such hearing then ever be a choice? For the self to contemplate itself as and through these voices invites an examination of relation and internalization as such. The dialogical self, compelling in its descriptive power, returns us to the question of a subject which is aware of the limit of any possible voice, yet which is compelled to attempt the articulation 411 What Geist would this gift give us... of itself in relation to each experience of its own voice as a multiplicity and which must define itself in relation to that experience. Thus, the self is itself at various points in play in the form of the voices and positions working through it. With hegel we can think this dynamic movement, the rhythm between the individual and society, in terms of “a shape of spirit”.35 The self is therefore the determinate actuality of various “forms of life”36 and a person chooses to posses (to be responsible to and for) a particular voice in relation to a particular set of personal and social circumstances and realities.37 however, as Terry Pinkard points out in his reading of hegel’s reading of Antigone: ...forms of life fall apart when the demand they place on their participants for a kind of intelligibility about themselves are no longer capable of being met... various demands are experienced as virtually unconditional but also at such odds with themselves that they become experienced as failures of intelligibility, even as failures and breakdowns within our agency itself. When the ‘ordinary’ ceases to be a home for us...that ‘shape of spirit’ is exhibiting the signs of its own decay.38 We are thus led to the possibility that dialogical voices, in being heard, are on one level a sign of decay; there is some element which cannot harmonize itself and so is explicitly heard. The self-conscious attempt to correct the score cannot but begin with an agency oriented toward an introjected purpose. In the terms of our discussion, the coming on to the scene of the dialogical self is a breakdown of a previous historical habit; erosion in the field of a now forgotten aim in which the subject had subsumed the awareness of itself as an ‘I’. and yet such discord and decay is a moment in and through which the subject is revealed. In the penultimate paragraph of the Philosophy of Nature, hegel writes: ...the universality which makes the animal, as a singular, a finite existence, reveals itself in it as the abstract power which terminates the internal process active within the animal, a process which is itself abstract. The disparity between its finitude and the universality is its original disease and the inborn germ of death, and the removal of this disparity is itself the accomplishment of this destiny.39 With the next paragraph begins the Anthropology. Thus, in thinking through the investigation of itself, mind moves to overcome its determinateness. habituating itself to aim or meaning is itself the attempt at a determinateness which abides, but which necessitates further action to preserve it (as when the voice becomes speech).40 It is the paradoxical struggle to place beyond becoming a determinateness which has an identity with non-determinateness; meaning...death. mind advances in the attempt to recover from what ‘I’ is; ‘I’ is what ‘I’ am dying of. In the self-conscious attempt to

What Geist would this gift give us: Seeing Hegel’s ‘Anthropology’ in contemporary personology