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Since the Supreme Court's 1895 decision in Sparf v. United States,' it has been a commonplace understanding that criminal juries have the power but not the right to nullify the law before them,2 either choosing to acquit or convict when they believe the law as presented by the judge to require otherwise. This power stems from a combination of a long-recognized protection of jurors to discharge their function with personal impunity,3 the double jeopardy prohibition on retrial of acquitted defendants,' and the practical difficulties of overturning erroneous guilty verdicts for insufficiency of evidence. 5 But, as the Sparf Court noted, that power does not translate into a right, at least absent some explicit authorization.6

License to Nullify: The Democratic and Constitutional Deficiencies of Authorized Jury Lawmaking