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In December 1953, a federal jury acquitted Alfonse Bartkus of robbing a federally insured bank. Because the Double Jeopardy Clause barred reprosecution of Bartkus in federal courts, the disappointed federal authorities instigated reprosecution of Bartkus by Illinois authorities under a state robbery statute. But the federal authorities did even more. They prepared the state case, guided the state prosecution, and postponed the sentencing of Bartkus' alleged coperpetrators until they testified against Bartkus at the state trial.' In January 1954, Bartkus was tried in state court on substantially the same facts. This time, he was convicted and sentenced to life in prison. The Supreme Court affirmed Bartkus' conviction on two grounds: (1) the Double Jeopardy Clause did not apply to the states;3 and (2) even if the Double Jeopardy Clause were to apply to the states, offenses against different sovereigns are not the "same offense" for double jeopardy purposes In 1969, the Court applied the Double Jeopardy Clause to the states, eviscerating the first ground for the decision in Bartkus After 1969, cases following Bartkus relied solely on the second ground, the dual sovereignty doctrine. This doctrine alone

Popular Sovereignty, Double Jeopardy, and the Dual Sovereignty Doctrine