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In recent years, in response to ever-increasing budget deficits, numerous politicians and commentators have argued that Congress should give the President greater powers to reduce federal spending through a variety of means, including the impoundment of funds.1 While such arguments may initially seem attractive to those who wish to control or eliminate the deficit, they also have significant implications for the principle of separation of powers and the constitutional requirement that "No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law."2 In light of the continuing pressures to respond to the budget deficit, proposals for expanded executive impoundment are likely to continue. This Note examines the current state of the law relating to the presidential impoundment of funds and will argue that Congress should resist proposals to expand presidential impoundment powers. Instead, Congress should create additional tools to insure that the President does not unconstitutionally impound funds in the future. Professor Kate Stith argues that there are two governing principles relating to the federal budget: (1) the Principle of the Public Fisc, which "assert[s] that all monies received from whatever source by any part of the government are public funds"3 and (2) the Principle of Appropriations Control, which "prohibit[s] expenditure of any public money without legislative authorization."4 There is also arguably a third principle, which is the inverse of the Principle of Appropriations Control. This principle, which this Note calls the Principle of Appropriation Expenditure, requires the expenditure of all money that is

Twisting the President's Arm: The Impoundment Control Act as a Tool for Enforcing the Principle of Appropriation Expenditure