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Constitutional Cultures contains many shrewd insights, and at least one spectacular insight. Every lawyer interested in the Constitution should read it. But read it only for specific insights, taken one at a time. The theory by which Nagel tries to unify these insights is part of the problem, not a step towards a solution. Thus, the book's whole is very much less than the sum of its parts. The insights are interspersed with polemic against judicial review in general and liberal judges in particular, blaming judges for all our constitutional ills and most constitutional change. The polemic is supported by a remarkably selective marshalling of history and examples. The book is difficult to summarize, in part because of its inductive style, and in part because it finds so many different things wrong with judicial review. The power of Nagel's argument is in his cumulation of examples of judicial review being done in ways he does not like. But not all of the examples seem consistent. Thus, he generally attacks the Court for trying to do too much, but he sometimes attacks the Court for doing too little.1 He offers only the most conclusory statement of what he thinks the Court should do instead,2 and gives no hint of how the Court should explain the results he would prefer. It is not clear whether he thinks that

Notes on the Role of Judicial Review, the Expansion of Federal Power, and the Structure of Constitutional Rights