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American constitutional theory has been marked by an ongoing effort to reconcile two fundamental propositions about constitutional law, legislation, and the judiciary in American society. The first proposition, which I will call the justification principle, asserts that there are occasions when judicial displacement of legislative decisionsjudicial review-is justified. The second proposition is that judges cannot justifiably do whatever they want, but must respect some constraints on their behavior as judges; this I will refer to as the restraint principle. Constitutional theory attempts to specify the constraints that judges must respect by deriving them from the Constitution and the nature of democracy. It seeks to constrain judges both directly, by the moral force it exerts on their work, and indirectly, by providing an agreed-upon standard against which their work can be measured. John Hart Ely, in his recent work Democracy and Distrust,' attempts to rework constitutional theory. In doing so, however, Ely suggests a conclusion that is obviously incompatible with his own position: an extension of Ely's reasoning leads to the proposition that constitutional theory is impossible; any theory that reconciles the justification prin-

Darkness on the Edge of Town: The Contributions of John Hart Ely to Constitutional Theory