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Under the law of agency, business principals often are held liable for the torts of their agents.' If the victim of an agent's2 tortious conduct can recover full compensation directly from the agent, however, the victim ordinarily has no reason to seek compensation from the agent's principal.3 The law of vicarious liability, therefore, exists primarily as a way to cope with the problem of judgment-proof agents.4 An important basis for the imposition of vicarious liability on a business principal is the existence of "control" or a right of "control" by the principal over the physical conduct of his agent.' If a tort is committed within the scope of the agent's employment,6 the existence of control is a sufficient but not a necessary condition for the imposition of vicarious liability.7 The principal also incurs vicarious liability if his agent, in the performance of his duties, commits a tort during the course of an "inherently dangerous activity." '8 Although these liability rules are widely in force, the theories advanced to explain them are at best incomplete.' As a step toward a rigorous theoretical basis for explanation and reform of the law, this Note develops a formal economic model of the principal-agent relationship to identify the circumstances under which vicarious liability is and is not an efficient liability rule."°

An Efficiency Analysis of Vicarious Liability under the Law of Agency