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There is some evidence that courts of equity in the eighteenth century and before, and in the early part of the nineteenth century, relied on procedures involving jury trial to determine disputed questions of fact. Because the evidence is modest it suggests rather than demonstrates the validity of the inferences that may be drawn from it. At the same time these inferences may be significant in assessing the constitutional position of jury trial in this country. This article seeks to contribute to that assessment and to encourage further research. Broadly, the evidence suggests that at the time of the adoption in 1791 of the Seventh Amendment guarantee of jury trial "in Suits at common law," the practice in the English Court of Chancery was in transition. The court was moving from a rule that disputed fact issues were generally, if not invariably, submitted to juries to one that made such submissions discretionary. The character of this transformation may be inferred from the language of cases decided at different points before and after 1791. In Webb v. Claverdon,2 decided in 1742, the court said:

Chancery Procedure and the Seventh Amendment: Jury Trial of Issues in Equity Cases before 1791