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The close relationship between a mutual fund and its management company has long generated fears concerning the size of fees paid to the management company for investment advice.' The original regulatory approach relied upon disclosure and a degree of shareholder participation in the fund's decisionmaking process.2 The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and Congress reacted to subsequent undesirable fee arrangements in management contracts by changing the regulatory strategy altogether. Congress established a standardized fee structure3 and placed upon courts the task of supervising fees. 4 These changes, made in 1970, have serious shortcomings and were undertaken prematurely. A system of shareholder control and meaningful disclosure had not been fully developed, and the shift in strategy was unwarranted.

Mutual Funds and Their Advisers: Strengthening Disclosure and Shareholder Control