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t Professor of Law, University of Utah College of Law. BA. 1953, Ursinus College; LL.B. 1956, Yale University; LL.M. 1962, New York University. The author wishes to thank Delano S. Findlay, a third-year student at the University of Utah College of Law, for his research assistance in the preparation of footnotes for this article. 1. Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Hirabayashi v. United States, 220 U.S. 81 (1943); see Rostow, The Japanese American Cases-A Disaster, 54 YALE L.J. 489 (1945). 2. 50 U.S.C. §§ 811, 813 (1964). The quotation is from the heading of 50 U.S.C., ch. 23, Subchapter II, "Emergency Detention of Suspected Security Risks." The statutory basis for detention is an executive finding, subject to administrative review, that "there is reasonable ground to believe that such person probably will engage in, or probably will conspire ith others to engage in, acts of espionage or of sabotage." 50 U.S.C. § 813. 50 U.S.C. § 819(h)(3) (1964) provides that in determining such probability the Attorney General, preliminary hearing officer and Board of Detention Review are authorized to consider, among other things, evidence of ".. . the holding at any time after January 1, 1949, of membership in, the Communist Party of the United States or any other organization or political party which seeks to overthrow or destroy by force and violence the Government of the United States ." The statute does not state whether membership alone is suffident by itself to establish the necessary probability for detention. Of course there are substantial questions of the constitutionality of these provisions. 3. See the recent landmark study, Projects, Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 14 U.C.L.A.L. Rav. 822 (1967); see also T. SzAsz, LAW, LIBErTY, AND PsYcuamIv (1963); F. L iNA & D. MclNrmx, TnE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAw (1961; Kadish, A Case Study in The Signification of Procedural Due Process-InslitudonaliZlng The Mentally I1, 9 IW. POL. Q. 93 (1956); Slovenko, The Psychiatric Patient, Liberty and the Law, 13 KAN. L. REv. 59 (1964). 4. Cf. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (196). 5. F. LINDmAN s & D. McINTYRE, supra note 3, at 298-312; Note, The Plight of the Sexual Psychopath: A Legislative Blunder and Judicial Acquiescence, 41 Nomna D sm LAw. 527 (1966); Swanson, Sexual Psychopath Statutes: Summar and Analysis, 51 J. CR. LC. & P.S. 215 (1960); Cohen, Administration of the Criminal Sexual Psychopath Statute in Indiana, 32 IND. L.J. 450 (1957); Tappan, Some Myths About the Sex Offendcr 19 FE. PROB., June 1955, at 7; Cf. In re Maddox, 351 Mich. 358, 88 N.W.2d 470 (1958); Commonwealth v. Page, 339 Mass. 313, 159 N.E.2d 82 (1959). 6. Aronowitz, Civil Commitment of Narcotics Addicts, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 405 (1967); Note, Civil Commitment of Narcotic Addicts, 76 YALE L.J. 1160 (1967); cf. Frankel, Narcotic Addiction, Criminal Responsibility, and Civil Commitment, 1966 UTAHr L. REv. 581. 7. F. IxmwAN & D. MCINra, supra note 3, at 298-99. Gordon & Harris, On Irvestiga.

Preventive Restraints and Just Compensation: Toward a Sanction Law of the Future