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A MR. SWARTWooD was the president of a corporation engaged in the business of running a flour mill. In 1919 the company's credit became shaky. To enable it to secure grain for its business, Mr. Swartwood entered into a writtca contract with a grain commission house, whereby he guaranteed the payment of "any and all sums of money" requested by the corporation and furnished by the commission house, until further notice. Large sums were furnished. The corporation later became bankrupt, and a balance of $40,000 for these advances remained unpaid. The commission house sued Mr. Swartwood upon his guaranty, and. he contended that it was orally agreed, at the time, that the guaranty should apply only to sums furnished for the purchase of grain by the milling company locally, at the small town where its mill and elevator were situated, whereas the sums sued for were advanced for purchases of grain in the Minneapolis market, to be shipped to the mill. At the trial, a jury accepted this contention, and judgment followed that the plaintiff take nothing from Mr-. Swartwood. To the appellate court, however, Mr. Swartwood's defense was quite unacceptable, because of the "rule which prevents the destruction of the obligation of a written contract by evidence of preceding or contemporaneous oral agreements." Significantly, the court added: "Without that rule there would be no assurance of the enforceability of a written contract. If such assurance were removed today from our law, general disaster would result, because of the consequent destruction of confidence, for the tremendous but closely adjusted machinery of modern business cannot function at all without confidence in the enforceability of contracts." 1 The court assumes as self-evident that without some special assurance of the enforcement of contracts as written, as against claims of inconsistent oral agreements, business men generally will be seriously handicapped in the prosecution of commercial enterprise. Like most of the law's basic assumptions, this one

The Parol Evidence Rule as a Procedural Device for Control of the Jury