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Much of the common law is concerned with allocating the costs of harm, such as the harm caused by accidents, nuisances, breaches of contract, or governmental takings of private property. There are at least two distinct goals for adopting allocative cost rules: the equity goal of compensating victims and the efficiency goal of minimizing costs to society as a whole.' These goals in turn can be formulated as two principles: the compensation principle and the marginal principle. The compensation principle states that victims should be compensated for harm caused by others. The marginal principle states that social costs should be minimized by equating the incremental benefit of each precautionary activity to its incremental cost. Is the common law primarily concerned with the justice of compensation or the efficiency of cost minimization? Presented this way, the two principles appear to be rival theories of law.' This Article, however, poses a different question: How does the common law combine the goal of compensation with the goal of minimizing social costs? The two principles now appear as complementary, rather than rival, explanations. As a result, this Article assumes that there are circumstances in which compensation is required for reasons of justice and examines mechanisms

Unity in Tort, Contract, and Property: The Model of Precaution