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Scholars have viewed the criminal procedure revolution as the quintessential example of the Supreme Court playing a countermajoritarian role. This Article argues that this view is mistaken, arguing that even the landmarks of the criminal procedure revolution illustrate the Supreme Court’s tendency to decide cases consistent with the prevailing policy positions and ideology of its time. In Part I, I consider two of the revolution’s early landmark decisions, Mapp v. Ohio and Gideon v. Wainwright. In Part II, I examine the strongest example of the Court’s countermajoritarian inclinations in the criminal justice area — Miranda v. Arizona — and in Part III, I discuss two of the revolution’s later landmark decisions, Katz v. United States and Terry v. Ohio. Time and again, the Supreme Court’s most controversial decisions have shown that the Justices are inextricably bound by the historical context in which they operate. We ought to recognize that fact and be more realistic in our conception of judicial review.

Countermajoritarian Hero or Zero? Rethinking the Warren Court's Role in the Criminal Procedure Revolution