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Many federal statutes provide for the recovery of reasonable attorney's fees by a "prevailing party."' Until recently, courts had interpreted prevailing party to include those who brought about a voluntary change in the defendant's conduct even though they did not obtain judicially sanctioned relief. Recovery was allowed under this socalled catalyst theory because the party had achieved its desired result in the lawsuit.2 The Supreme Court, however, rejected this definition of prevailing party for the purposes of recovery under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA")3 and the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 ("FHAA")4 in Buckhannon Board and Care Home, Inc v West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources.5 The Court held that a party that merely serves as a catalyst does not qualify as a prevailing party under these statutes.6 By rejecting the definition of prevailing party on which a majority of circuit courts had settled, the Court severely limited a party's ability to recover attorney's fees. The narrower definition of prevailing party embraced by the Buckhannon Court has serious implications, particularly concerning civil rights and the possibility of its extension to other federal statutes, such as the Equal Access to Justice Act ("EAJA").7 This Comment ex-

Catalysts as Prevailing Parties under the Equal Access to Justice Act