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The power to appoint federal judges is one of the few components of the Constitution to involve all three branches of the government. The framers considered this power so crucial and potentially dangerous that they explicitly divided it between the President and Congress. The partisan interests of the President, reflected in his chosen nominees, were pitted against the corresponding interests of the Senate, reflected in its unrestrained power to accept or reject those nominees.' Any effort to circumvent this precise separation of powers therefore should be met with skepticism. And any attempt to alter the balancing of partisan interests is even more dubious. Nevertheless, one unique federal law does exactly this. Beyond residency requirements, the President has unbounded discretion to choose his nominees for the federal bench. But the President is significantly restrained in his selection of nominees to the Court of International Trade ("CIT"). By statute, no more than five of the nine members of the CIT may be from any one political party. This Comment considers whether this requirement for political party diversity on the CIT violates the Appointments Clause of Article II of the Constitution Part I describes the CIT and the evolution of its unique political party diversity requirement. Part II examines formalist and functionalist theories of the separation of powers, other restrictions on the President's power to nominate federal officers, and the scant judicial treatment of such restrictions. Parts III and IV explore in detail the CIT's political party diversity requirement using

The Court of International Trade's Political Party Diversity Requirement: Unconstitutional under Any Separation of Powers Theory