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My thesis is simple: Law is essentially formalistic, and morality is not in the slightest degree formalistic. My plan to establish this thesis is as follows: In Part I, I define what I mean by formalism. In Part II, I present my argument for why law is essentially formalistic. I maintain that the problem law is meant to solve is that of information, not immoral motivation-that men are not gods, rather than that men are not angels. To solve this problem, law must consist of determinate rules. Standards are unhelpful. And theories of law such as the "justice-seeking Constitution" or other heavily moralized versions of constitutional or statutory interpretation recreate the very problem law is meant to solve. In Part Ill, I identify the basic dilemma that formalistic law presents and then canvass various methods that have been advanced as solutions to that dilemma. The dilemma raises the question whether formalism, and hence law, is a possibility for fully rational agents who understand its nature. In Part IV, I turn to morality. Here, in opposition to a thesis recently advanced by Leo Katz,' I argue that formalism is completely absent from morality, despite some appearances to the contrary. Deontological side constraints are not formalistic rules and do not function as such. Finally, in Part V, I raise not the question whether formalistic law is possible-the problem of Part IH-but the question whether formalistic law is by its very nature a violation of deontological side constraints. I conclude that law may turn out to be a moral possibility only for consequentialists.

"With Me, It's All er Nuthin'": Formalism in Law and Morality