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An issue that frequently arises in criminal prosecutions is whether special procedural measures are required to protect a defendant from the possibility of a partial jury.1 One such measure, though not often considered as such,2 is to allow the defendant to waive his right to a jury and submit to a bench trial.3 Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 23(a), however, permits a defendant to waive trial by jury only with "the approval of the court and the consent of the government,"4 thereby significantly curtailing the availability of a bench trial as a means of countering jury partiality in federal criminal proceedings. The constitutionality of the rule's requirement of government consent was upheld in Singer v. United States.5 Singer also raised the possibility that government consent might not be required where "the Government's insistence on trial by jury would result in the denial to a defendant of an impartial trial."6 This comment argues that the possibility raised by Singer-that the defendant's right to an "impartial trial" may enable the defendant to insist on a bench trial-is wholly illusory. After establishing that the Singer caveat can only conceivably rest upon the defendant's due process right to a fair trial, the comment surveys the current case law interpreting Singer and finds that it largely fails to explain when this right entitles the defendant to a

Singer v. United States and the Misapprehended Source of the Nonconsensual Bench Trial