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Freed and Polsby's basic insight is that comparable-worth issues arise under the Equal Pay Act.' They consider the acceptance of the Act to be anomalous, given the controversy over the merits of a comparable-worth rule.2 Whether they mean to say more than this is not clear, but they seem at least to suggest that the Equal Pay Act's interference with market values should be more controversial.3 Further, they seem to be making an indirect argument about the merits of a comparable-worth rule: given the existing case law, there is reason to doubt the competency of courts to decide comparable-worth claims.4 I think that Freed and Polsby's basic insight is quite right: there are comparable-worth issues in current Equal Pay Act cases. I also agree that courts should be reluctant to decide cases solely on the basis of comparable-worth arguments. Congress considered and rejected a comparable-worth standard when it enacted the Equal Pay Act," and courts should apply the antidiscrimination legislation Congress did enact in a manner consistent with congressional intent. Nevertheless, I have three major problems with Freed and Polsby's analysis. First, Freed and Polsby purport to be criticizing Equal Pay Act case law only because of courts' willingness to decide cases on the basis of comparable-worth arguments.6 But their real objection may be to antidiscrimination legislation as such. Comparable-worth problems are not unique to Equal Pay Act cases; they are innate in the implementation of any antidiscrimination legislation. If Freed and Polsby disagree, on the merits, with

Comparable Worth in Antidiscrimination Legislation: A Reply to Freed and Polsby