English (United Kingdom)

https://curated-unify.zendy.io/wp-json/zendy-region/v1/featured_content/oa?rat=en

https://curated-unify.zendy.io/wp-json/zendy-region/v1/highlighted_journal/

Zendy Plus

Presents the access of premium content as premium feature

Premium Content

Presents the keyphrase highlighting as premium feature

Keyphrase Highlighting

Presents the summarisation as premium feature

Summarisation

Insights

Presents the pdf analysis as premium feature

PDF Analysis

Presents the zaia usage as premium feature

ZAIA

Zendy Tools

Zendy Open

Coordination among firms presents a policy dilemma. Efficiency may require coordinated action, but coordinated action can stifle competition and make collusion more likely. This policy dilemma arises frequently, as, for example, in cases involving information exchanges among competing firms.' Knowing a competitor's price makes it easier not only to set prices in line with the market, but also to fix prices noncompetitively. The setting of physical product standards2 also illustrates the trade-off between efficiency and competition. Standards can have obvious efficiency effects, yet they can also be a tool by which established firms exclude entrants. The case of Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co.3 demonstrates the way in which standard setting can be an anticompetitive practice.4 The

The Need for Coordination among Firms, with Special Reference to Network Industries