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In 1793 Congress enacted a statute prohibiting courts of the United States from granting writs of injunction to stay proceedings in any court of a state.' Until 1941, however, the Supreme Court consistently disregarded the broad language of the statute2 and created a large number of judicial exceptions.3 In that year the Court, in Toucey v. New York Life Ins. Co.,4 reversed this trend and returned to a literal interpretation of the prohibition. This decision threatened to destroy most of the judicial exceptions and led to a congressional revision of the statute in 1948 to include three general exceptions.5 Since the 1948 revision the Supreme Court has struggled with questions of how broadly these exceptions should be interpreted. 6 The issues are difficult and the controversy evenly balanced. The interest of effective protection of rights guaranteed by the Constitution and

Federal Court Stays of State Court Proceedings: A Re-Examination of Original Congressional Intent