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ROLAND McK .I. Professor Buchanan's comments on the defense of caveat emptor posed few issues with which I would disagree. Using different terminology, I did make the central point that caveat emptor as the basis for products liability does at least lower certain costs in connection with certain product categories. That does not mean that there is a dear-cut case that any logical man must accept for approving caveat emptor. It just means that there are certain consequences of having that arrangement that can logically be agreed upon. Professor Calabresi perceptively emphasized categories of products as the correct approach to a fuller discussion of products liability. I did say that for some products one might prefer caveat emptor while for other products one might prefer government intervention or producer liability. But I did neglect the analysis of particular product categories, aside from choosing specific examples from different product categories to illustrate different points. This is a direction in which one could profitably move. For particular kinds of product categories what would the costs be of having different liability assignments, different arrangements? Calabresi has made some progress in that direction, and my hunch is that we can profitably go still further and look at the categories in greater detail. A minor matter of disagreement between Calabresi and myself might occur in connection with this idea of trading fairness for efficiency. I think of myself as occasionally making a trade-off of what I consider a fair or equitable arrangement for a bit of something else-greater efficiency or some other objective. If there were really and truly zero transaction costs, we would not have to make that trade-off. But since there are not zero costs, I think sometimes one is forced to ask himself would he prefer an arrangement which corresponds more closely to what he would regard as equitable, or would he prefer another arrangement which gives up a little equity for some other objective. Now

Edited Transcript of AALS-AEA Conference on Products Liability