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T HE law relating to res ipsa loquitur is replete with conflict, confusion and doubt. There is division of opinion as to the circumstances required for its application and still greater disagreement as to the effect to be given it. Does it merely lay the basis for a permissible inference of negligence by the jury or does it raise a presumption of negligence, and if and where it raises a presumption, what weight is to be given to it? It is not clear that where it is treated as a presumption, the court will direct a verdict for the plaintiff in the absence of rebuttal evidence by the defendant, nor is it at all clear what quantity of evidence will be required to prevent a directed verdict or how far the presumption survives the refusal to direct a verdict for the plaintiff, that is, what effect the jury shall give it. Then, too, there is much confusion with respect to the effect of pleading special acts of negligence. It is the belief of the writer that it is wholly useless and mischievous to have a distinct doctrine of res ipsa loquitur which has the effect merely of laying the foundation for a permissible inference of negligence, and that it best serves its excuse for being if it is treated as a presumption which shifts the burden of proof to the defendant. A brief statement of the law relating to res ipsa loquitur as found in the decisions will lay the foundation for our argument.

The Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur