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Contractual agreements requiring a supplier to deal exclusively with a single distributor frequently serve as the foundation for business distribution systems. Antitrust law rarely questions the legality of such exclusive dealing agreements, which often create market efficiencies at both the supplier and distributor levels. However, when exclusive dealing has as its purpose or effect the elimination of actual or potential competitors from the market, it falls squarely within the reach of the antitrust laws. This potential both to create efficiencies and to inhibit natural competitive forces has proven problematic for courts interpreting antitrust law and applying it to exclusive dealing arrangements. The primary goal of antitrust law, as articulated both by Congress' and by the courts,2 is the promotion of competition in the marketplace. Congress's original intent in enacting the Sherman Act3 was the elimination of business combinations and other restraints of trade that created monopoly.4 Yet antitrust law tolerates monopoly that results from legitimate, competitive business

Beyond Economic Theory: A Model for Analyzing the Antitrust Implications of Exclusive Dealing Arrangements