English (United Kingdom)

https://curated-unify.zendy.io/wp-json/zendy-region/v1/featured_content/oa?rat=en

https://curated-unify.zendy.io/wp-json/zendy-region/v1/highlighted_journal/

Zendy Plus

Presents the access of premium content as premium feature

Premium Content

Presents the keyphrase highlighting as premium feature

Keyphrase Highlighting

Presents the summarisation as premium feature

Summarisation

Insights

Presents the pdf analysis as premium feature

PDF Analysis

Presents the zaia usage as premium feature

ZAIA

Zendy Tools

Zendy Open

This essay examines Congress' use of institutional representation of Congress and its surrounding controversies. Congress uses institutional counsel in two ways: first, Congress uses it in litigation with the President over the constitutionality of statutes, as illustrated by INS v. Chada. Second, Congress uses institutional representation when competing partisan or individual interests make it difficult to find institutional interests, such that it appears like counsel is serving individual, rather than constitutional, interests. This is best illustrated by the 1995 Senate vote to send the Senate Legal Counsel to enforce a Whitewater Committee subpoena for Presidential counsels' notes.Examining the development of the House and Senate Counsels, the author addresses how the current legal challenges facing Congress, particularly those in the context of executive, partisan, and individual interests, have changed and intensified over the past few years. With Congress facing an increasing number of disputes regarding the constitutionality of statutes and are increasingly challenged to resolve conflicts between partisan and public interests, the author proposes that Congress continue to force their counsel offices to provide consistent representation that to defines, refines, and defends institutional interests.

The Senate and House Counsel Offices: Dilemmas of Representing in Court the Institutional Congressional Client