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In his well-known book on insider trading, Henry Manne reported the outraged reaction of "an anonymous lady law student who in a classroom discussion of the subject, stamped her foot and angrily declaimed, 'I don't care; it's just not right."'1 By putting the ethical argument against insider trading in the mouth of someone so obviously insubstantial by his lights, Manne began the fairly persistent tendency of commentators to address the general morality of insider trading as if it were a fuzzy abstraction, to be swept away easily with more substantial and hard-edged arguments about specific fiduciary duties, general economic efficiency, and property rights in information.2 This article attempts to elaborate what the "lady law student" might have meant by saying that insider trading is "just not right." I believe she expressed an important intuition, and this article suggests a rationale for forbidding insider trading, filling out the reasoning behind this intuition. In the last decade and a half, the Supreme Court has developed a theory of insider trading based primarily on an account of fiduciary duties that securities traders owe to specific others, particularly those with whom they trade and, perhaps, those from whom they receive information.3 The United States Court

"It's Just Not Right": The Ethics of Insider Trading