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When the legal history of the 1970's is written, it will note a significant shift in the way courts perceived shareholder litigation. Only a generation ago, the Supreme Court described the derivative action as "the chief regulator of corporate management."' Even into the 1960's, those issues involving shareholder litigation that percolated up to the Supreme Court were typically resolved so as to extend the availability of a litigation remedy by removing arbitrary or overbroad barriers to the plaintiff. 2 During the 1970's, the pendulum swung sharply in the other direction. In particular, the Supreme Court tilted the balance of advantage against the plaintiff in securities litigation by (1) declining repeatedly to imply private causes of action under the federal securities laws, at least absent a clear

The Unfaithful Champion: The Plaintiff as Monitor in Shareholder Litigation