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There is presently ongoing an extensive debate concerning the scope and implications of the constitutional requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal cases. In a remarkably short period of time the debate has generated a literature sufficiently vast so that complete citation is precluded simply for lack of space.1 Much more importantly, a review of randomly selected criminal cases indicates that ambiguity concerning the implications of the requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt may be generating as much litigation as any other constellation of issues in the criminal process. Indeed, these two phenomena are intimately related. One of the attractions of this area for scholars is precisely the ambiguity that generates litigation. The primary source of the ambiguity is by now an oft-told tale in no need of elaboration here. In brief, the ambiguity is the direct result of the United States Supreme Court having constitutionalized the requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt without providing any but the most trivial explicit criteria for its application.2 The result has been

the journal of criminal law and criminology (1973-)

Rationality and Accuracy in the Criminal Process: A Discordant Note on the Harmonizing of the Justices' Views on Burdens of Persuasion in Criminal Cases