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This paper examines the explanatory gap account. The key notions for its  proper understanding are analyzed. In particular, the analysis is concerned  with the role of “thick” and “thin” modes of presentation and “thick” and  “thin” concepts which are relevant for the notions of “thick” and “thin”  conceivability, and to that effect relevant for the gappy and non-gappy  identities. The last section of the paper discusses the issue of the  intelligibility of explanations. One of the conclusions is that the  explanatory gap account only succeeds in establishing the epistemic gap. The  claim that psychophysical identity is not intelligibly explicable, and thus  opens the explanatory gap, would require an independent argument which would  prove that intelligible explanations stem only from conceptual analysis.  This, I argue, is not the case

The explanatory gap account and intelligibility of explanation