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The paper centers on some problematic theses of my book Kant’s Political  Legacy. Human Rights, Peace, Progress (UWP 2017). This reconsideration is  occasioned partly by comments I received and partly by my own process of  self-criticism. I focus on the point that commentators have mainly  criticized, that is, the link I suggest between human dignity and our  capacity for moral behavior, or autonomy. The first part recalls the basic  features of my Kant-inspired and yet in many regards anti-Kantian account of  the relation between dignity and autonomy and replies to some criticisms  received from orthodox Kantians. The second part is strictly connected to  the first because it deals with the reasons we have to believe that we are  autonomous. While in the book I sketched Kant’s own reasons for the ‘reality  of freedom,’ as he puts it, I focus now on Bojan Kovacevic’s suggestion to  look at characters in novels written by artistic geniuses (in particular Leo  Tolstoy) to find indirect evidence in favor of autonomy. This allows me to  reflect on the kind of evidence one can legitimately expect in the proof at  issue. Thirdly, I reply to a classical objection, ignored in the book, that  impacts with equal force Kant’s ethics and my own position. The problem  concerns people with temporary or permanent impairment of rational  capacities. If I let human dignity depend on our capacity for autonomous  behavior, am I committed to the counterintuitive (and rather devastating)  conclusion that children or people suffering from momentary or irreversible  loss of rational capacity, and a fortiori of autonomy, do not have dignity  and therefore do not deserve to be protected by human rights?

Replies: Autonomy and human dignity. A reassessment of Kant’s political legacy. Human rights, peace, progress