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Two decades ago, much corporate governance literature on ownership focused on active ownership as a powerful solution to important aspects of the principal-agent problems that haunt corporations. In hindsight, it is easy to see that this made a lot of sense during the several preceding decades which witnessed high economic growth and increasingly sophisticated financial markets. In the US, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) famously argued for a corporate governance system that combines large ownership stakes with enough power and incentive to be active with appropriate minority shareholder protection. Active ownership, in this way, serves to maximize shareholder value, primarily by improving the governance of the various principal-agent relations. Abstract

Ownership strategy: A governance mechanism for collective action and responsible ownership