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The earnings management practices are classified as either the change in the accrual process (AEM) or the deviation from normal business activity (REM). In AEM, managers intervene in the financial reporting process by exercising discretion and judgment regarding accounting choices. REM, on the other hand, requires departing from normal operations, driven by the desire of managers to deceive at least some stakeholders to consider that the reported financial performance has been achieved from normal operations (Kothari, Mizik & Roychowdhury, 2015). Those earnings management types are managers ́ decisions to alter a current period’s earnings to achieve temporary goals that may adversely affect the firm’s long-term value maximization objective. In terms of agency problems, the complex nature of state-owned companies (SOs), it is important to compare it with the privatelyowned ones (POs). In the SOs, there is an additional agency relationship compared POs, as the controlling owners are themselves agents of the real owner (the state) (Ding, Zhang & Zhang, 2007). It is broadly argued that state companies practice earnings management more than private ones. This argument is based on the following reasons; first, due to reasons such as governmental interference, low compensations, the lack of competition, corporate inefficiency and poor governance, misallocations of resources, and unethical behaviors such as corruption and fraud (Boardman & Vining, 1989). Second, agency problems are more severe in SOs than in POs due to the various forms of conflicts including those between the state and minority and between state and managers (Wang & Yung, 2011). Abstract

Accrual and real earnings management in both state-owned and privately-owned Egyptian companies