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The question of whether CEO duality contributes to or constrains earnings management has been debated for decades. Yet there is conflicting evidence in previous literature, this paper firstly finds that CEO duality are positively related to earnings management in China’s unique environment. Secondly our empirical evidence suggests that internal and external board mechanisms can moderate CEO duality’s effects on earnings management. Board mechanisms, i.e. board independence level and audit committee can moderate the positive relationship between CEO duality and earnings management. Furthermore, the factor analysis shows that certain combination of board mechanisms can also mitigates the effects of CEO power on earnings management.

The effects of board mechanisms and ownership on the relationship between CEO duality and earnings management in China’s listed companies