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In the past decade, scientists, policymakers, ethicists and citizens have become increasingly aware that scientific research that promotes public health and safety has the potential to be used for terrorist, criminal or other malevolent purposes.1 The phrase ‘dual-use research’ refers to research that may have beneficial as well as detrimental consequences. The National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB), a US Government committee that provides advice to researchers and federal agencies, has defined ‘dual-use research of concern’ as ‘research that, based on current understanding, can be reasonably anticipated to provide knowledge, products, or technologies that could be directly misapplied by others to pose a threat to public health and safety, agricultural crops and other plants, animals, the environment or materiel’.2 Examples of published research that has raised dual-use issues include research on a mousepox virus that could be used to enhance the virulence of the human smallpox virus,3 a study showing how to manufacture a polio virus from available sequence data

Scientific Control Over Dual-Use Research: Prospects for Self-Regulation