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ie negotiations on agricultural policies played an important role in the Uru­ guay Round of the GATT, agreement on which was signed at Marrakesh in April 1994. The six years taken to reach agreement on agriculture reflected both the political sensitivity and the technical complexity of the agenda. The Agreement on Agriculture that is part of the new GATT within the World Trade Organisation (WTO) is to be implemented in July 1995. The Agreement will not deliver agricultural trade liberalisation in the short to medium term as many had hoped and as seemed possible when the Draft Final Act was published in December 1991. Instead, the Agreement has produced a new set of operational rules for domestic agricultural and agricultural trade policies. The long-standing device of bindings used in the GATT — that tariff rates, once agreed, cannot be increased without compensation to the contracting parties — has been extended for agricultural policies to levels of domestic transfers and to export sub­ sidies, as well as to import tariffs. This innovation represents a fundamental break­ through because, given the dismal history of agricultural negotiations in previous GATT Rounds, it was necessary to change the rules if long-lasting trade liberalisa­ tion was to be achieved. The monitoring of adherence to these new rules by the Committee on Agriculture in the W TO, together with improved dispute settlement procedures, should ensure that governments are able to resist more resolutely the demands for higher income support from their farm lobbies and that, eventually, international trade in agricultural products will reflect comparative advantage rather than domestic agricultural policies and budgetary expenditures on these policies. Traditionally, economists, using the tools of applied welfare economics, have viewed government as an omniscient planner, aloof from the influence of farm lobby groups. In reality, governments in the developed countries have largely been captured by these lobbies and, therefore, are not independent in the policy deci­ sions taken.

The Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture: A New Order?